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POSTCRITICAL 
THEORY? 
DEMANDING THE 
POSSIBLE
Jeff Pruchnic
Walled States, Waning Sovereignty 
by Wendy Brown. New 
York: Zone, 2010. Pp. 168, 10 
illustrations. $25.95 cloth.
Cosmopolitics I by Isabelle 
Stengers. Translated by Robert 
Bononno. Posthumanities Series, 
9. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2010. Pp. 310. 
$75.00 cloth; $25.00 paper.
Fanaticism: On the Uses of an Idea 
by Alberto Toscano. London: 
Verso, 2010. Pp. 304. $26.95 cloth.
Envisioning Real Utopias by Erik 
Olin Wright. London: Verso, 
2010. Pp. 288/416. $95 cloth; 
$26.95 paper.
“Post” indicates a very particular 
condition of afterness in which what 
is past is not left behind, but, on the 
contrary, relentlessly conditions, even 
dominates, a present that neverthe-
less also breaks in some way with this 
past. In other words, we use the term 
“post” only for a present whose past 
continues to capture and structure it.
—Wendy Brown, 
Walled States (21)
If learning to think is learning to 
resist a future that presents itself as 
obvious, plausible, and normal, we 
cannot do so either by evoking an 
abstract future, from which every-
thing subject to our disapproval has 
been swept aside, or by referring to 
a distant cause that we could and 
should imagine to be free of any 
compromise.
—Isabelle Stengers, 
Cosmopolitics I (10)
Popular reports of the demise of 
critical theory in the humanities 
and social sciences during the first 
decade of the new century were 
far from the first time the “death 
of theory” had been pronounced. 
However, they may have been the 
first in which the enterprise was 
presented as a victim of its own suc-
cess. The first influential argument 
of this type may have been Michael 
Hardt and Antonio Negri’s depic-
tion of postmodern and postco-
lonial theory as little more than 
“symptoms of passage” toward new 
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forms of social power that appro-
priate the generic goals and tech-
niques of leftist thought. As they 
write in 2000’s Empire, much like 
left-oriented critical theorists, in-
ternational capitalism is also “bent 
on doing away with those modern 
forms of sovereignty and on setting 
difference to play across boundar-
ies,” the key difference being that 
the latter has been much more suc-
cessful in the endeavor.1
The more specific co-opting of 
analytical and rhetorical forms na-
tive to critical theory by right-wing 
ideologues was perhaps most poi-
gnantly outlined by Bruno Latour 
in his contribution to a 2004 issue 
of Critical Inquiry themed around 
the journal’s colloquium on theo-
ry’s future and, in particular, the 
rather discouraging coverage of the 
same by the New York Times (an 
article with the memorably blunt 
title “The Latest Theory Is That 
Theory Doesn’t Matter”2). In ad-
dressing the titular question of his 
essay “Why Has Critique Run Out 
of Steam?” Latour concludes that 
it is not so much the operation 
of critique itself that has become 
moribund, but that the method-
ologies long associated with the 
practice—the analysis of truth 
claims in reference to the ideologi-
cal dispositions of its claimants, 
the presumption that no institu-
tions of any real social influence 
are innocent of the effects of social 
power—had been shown to be 
equally (more?) successful in the 
hands of climate-change deniers, 
libertarian-influenced conspiracy 
theorists, and conservative culture 
warriors of almost all stripes as they 
had previously been for science and 
technology studies scholars such as 
Latour.3 Latour’s focus on the ama-
teur theorizing of republican image 
consultants was to become only one 
of the first in a long series of such 
ironic appropriations documented 
in the coming years; indeed, by 
the end of the decade, it was in-
creasingly hard to feign surprise 
at reports that Gilles Deleuze and 
Félix Guattari were required read-
ing for members of the Israeli De-
fense Force or that Jean-Francois 
Lyotard’s writings were becoming 
as popular with advertising and 
marketing students as they once 
were with English Lit graduates.4
As always, however, the most 
revealing description comes from 
the loyal opposition. In a recent 
interview, the conservative online 
media mogul Andrew Breitbart 
discusses the initial confusion he 
experienced when taking courses 
in American studies as a Tulane 
University undergrad—“I don’t 
understand what this deconstruc-
tive semiotic bullshit is. Who the 
fuck is Michel Foucault?”—before 
he realized the real lesson of critical 
theory.5 Arguing for a fairly straight 
line running from the emigration 
of Frankfurt school intellectuals 
to the United States in the 1930s to 
the election of the “radical” Barack 
Obama to the US presidency over 
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a half-century later, Breitbart em-
phasizes the universal appeal of 
identifying one’s political leanings 
as oppositional to dominant culture 
and, more generally, the power of 
skepticism as a populist messaging 
strategy. For Breitbart, the Ameri-
can Left have historically been 
more capable at using this strategy 
to their advantage, putting Ameri-
can conservatives at an extreme dis-
advantage. (Who knew that during 
the same time center-left voters 
were crowing about the need for 
a “Democratic Rove,” at least one 
conservative was hoping for the ap-
pearance of something like a “Re-
publican Adorno”?)
Breitbart is only one of the more 
vocal members of a larger group 
that seemed to have learned a simi-
lar lesson and been eager to close the 
lead that progressives had suppos-
edly gained in the area of cultural 
critique; from the populism-baiting 
of the Tea Party, to the by-now-
clichéd critiques of the “liberal 
media,” to outright conspiracy 
theory, skepticism, particularly on 
the level of whatever is defined as 
the consensus of “the elites” or of 
“dominant culture,” has become as 
much, if not more so, the domain 
of the mainstream conservatism 
than of intellectual progressivism. 
Combine this shift in the discursive 
turf of public politics with interna-
tional capitalism’s ability to thrive 
in a market of niche identities, and 
the academic Left seem to be the 
victims not so much of a backlash 
against ideational propriety as they 
are of an outright theft of intellec-
tual property.
And it is the visibility of this 
kind of appropriation that makes 
the most recent proclamations of 
the death of critical theory all the 
more hard to bear. If the problem 
is not that critical theory’s reliance 
on categories of oppositionality, re-
sistance, and skepticism is in need 
of bolstering, but rather that these 
categories have turned out to be 
so powerful that they work even 
in the service of highly retrograde 
causes, those of us interested in the 
progressive possibilities of what we 
have come to call critical theory 
over the last several decades are left 
in something of a quandary.
The popular response by the crit-
ically attuned humanities and social 
sciences to this dilemma was ably 
summarized by Fredric Jameson 
in 2002; emphasizing that although 
one of the major triumphs of criti-
cal theory was “to have discredited 
‘philosophy’ in the traditional disci-
plinary sense,” Jameson notes that 
in the early twentieth-first century 
a reversal had begun, an emergent 
“return of traditional philosophy all 
over the world, beginning with its 
hoariest subfields, such as ethics.” 
Perhaps more striking today, a de-
cade after Jameson’s writing, is the 
prediction disguised as a question 
that follows this observation: “[C]
an metaphysics be far behind, one 
wonders (there are New Age spec-
ulations about physics that suggest 
640 JEFF PRUCHNIC
it), if not theology itself (of which 
negative theology had promised 
the undermining)?”6
Jameson’s speculation here is 
one we have seen roughly fulfilled 
in the recent past of the critical-
theory market. The return of ethics 
seen in the ascendency of thinkers 
such as Emmanuel Levinas and 
Maurice Blanchot around the time 
of Jameson’s writing quickly gave 
way to the closest we might come 
to a return to theology within criti-
cal theory, the so-called postsecular 
turn in theory (one that perhaps 
found its most charismatic texts in 
the late writings of Jacques Derrida, 
but is also clearly present in the im-
brication of theology and politics by 
writers as Giorgio Agamben, Alain 
Badiou, and Slavoj Žižek). If that 
movement seems to be running 
out of steam as of late—Agamben’s 
2007 Il Regno el la Gloria (The King-
dom and the Glory), which in part 
suggests that politics is not so much 
secularized religion but religion 
“fulfilled” through its own disap-
pearance, like a snake eating its tail, 
might be a fitting if not necessary 
bookend—this has only made it all 
the more clear that the middle term 
under review here, metaphysics, has 
really been the connecting thread 
behind recent critical-intellectual 
work all along. More precisely, we 
might say that after the “death” of 
theory, theorists have returned to 
what Adorno called, in one of the 
founding texts of critical theory, 
“that question which today is called 
radical and which is really the least 
radical of all: the question of being 
(Sein) itself.”7
Indeed, if there remains a guid-
ing principle to politically attuned 
philosophy and critical theory 
today, it is what Carsten Strathau-
sen calls “neo-left ontology.” For 
Strathausen, although ontology has 
returned in a big way in the work of 
pivotal philosophers and theorists, 
it is one in which the traditional 
goal of determining categories of 
transhistorical essence has notably 
given way to imagining the “his-
torically contingent construction of 
a different ‘nature’ from the one we 
presently inhabit” that may, in turn, 
map potentials for political change.8 
Strathausen presents a compelling 
case for how this objective forms 
at least a family resemblance if not 
a coherent group identity between 
a diverse range of recent work by 
Ernesto Laclau, William Con-
nolly, Jacques Rancière, the “late 
Derrida,” and Fredric Jameson, 
in addition to those of more obvi-
ous candidates such as Jean-Luc 
Nancy, Agamben, Negri, Badiou, 
and Žižek. However, it is really the 
latter two—Badiou and Žižek—
who most exemplify the return to 
ontology as both critique of, as well 
as replacement for, the major intel-
lectual trends of the “big theory” 
error of the humanities and social 
sciences (which is to say, theory as it 
was commonly understood since at 
least the early 1980s). Despite sig-
nificant divergences on a number 
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of other points, Badiou and Žižek 
share an approach to bridging the 
ontological and the political that is 
perhaps best summarized by the 
title of Simon Critchley’s Levinas- 
and Badiou-influenced work, Infi-
nitely Demanding.9 On one side, the 
subject is “riven,” “called,” or even 
“constituted” by a particular event 
or course of action; on the other, its 
concrete involvement in the politi-
cal, or at least the involvement we 
are aiming for, then emerges in a 
necessary opposition to the “natu-
ral” or apparent conditions of pos-
sibility in the contemporary social 
environment, a demand that ex-
ceeds what is offered by the domi-
nant institutions of social power.
In this sense, as Adrian John-
ston suggests in his excellent analy-
sis of Badiou’s and Žižek’s theories 
of political transformation, it is 
useful to consider their work on 
this question in relation to the old 
saying often associated with May 
’68: “Be Reasonable: Demand the 
Impossible!” Although the in-
creasing co-option of postmodern 
or post-structuralist strategies of 
critique and resistance by domi-
nant institutions of social power 
would seem to make radical and 
revolutionary change ever less of 
a possibility, “Badiou and Žižek 
tirelessly remind their audiences 
that conceptions of realistic possi-
bilities are themselves historically 
transitory constructions.”10 Such a 
focus undergirds both their inter-
ests in unpacking various logics 
of identity and rupture, as well as 
their shared emphasis on, if not 
outright fetishization of, the power 
of revolutionary moments whose 
historical rarity is inversely pro-
portional to their refiguring of so-
cial potentialities.
Although this blend of the 
metaphysical and the political has 
for many had the highly salutary 
effect of explicitly (re)emphasizing 
how the work of critical theory or 
philosophy does or should intersect 
with actual politics, as many critics 
have pointed out, it also seems to 
ignore the incremental, quotidian, 
or pragmatic vectors of political ac-
tion in favor of the revolutionary, 
the quirky, and the ideal. In other 
words, by presenting the relatively 
rare revolutionary event and the 
equally exceptional subjects com-
mitted to these events as their privi-
leged examples of political change, 
Badiou and Žižek often seem to 
neglect the process through which 
people are motivated to participate 
in such actions, as well as the steps 
that must occur between the static 
present and the hoped-for future. 
In this sense, when radical trans-
formation is not actively happen-
ing, Badiou and Žižek’s ontological 
engagement with politics can also 
look much like an advocation of 
spontaneous commitment (volun-
tarism), nonengagement (quiet-
ism), and the relentless critique of 
strategies and movements that fail 
to meet the rigid criteria of what 
counts as change (absolutism).
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The books under review in this 
essay might be taken as representa-
tive of a countermovement to the 
above, an incipient and collective 
rethinking of critical theory for 
the present that acknowledges the 
co-option of many of the strategies 
associated with leftist theorizing, 
but attempts to rethink the generic 
objectives of critical theory itself 
with stricter attention to questions 
of human motivation (rather than 
ideation), and that places a higher 
priority on strategies for seizing on 
the constrained possibilities pres-
ent within existing systems of social 
power than on critique as tradi-
tionally understood. In this sense, 
the theorizing they offer might be 
called postcritical in the way that 
one of the authors, Wendy Brown, 
glosses the term in her foregoing 
epigraph: their ethos and angle of 
approach are created through a 
necessary engagement with, rather 
than dismissal of, the dominant 
vectors of recent critical theory.
Concerns over the current state 
and future direction of critical 
theory as a politically meaningful 
enterprise is ostensibly a side issue 
to Brown’s Walled States, Waning 
Sovereignty but one inextricably 
bound up with the book’s sharp, 
exceedingly engaging analysis of 
state power inside what she codes 
“the post-Westphalian world” of 
the present (21). Brown’s analysis 
of the walled states of the book’s 
title—namely, the increasing num-
ber of physical barriers being built 
around and inside the borders of 
various nation-states—forms the 
centerpiece of her investigation 
into the paradoxes of contempo-
rary social power. The upsurge 
of interest in such old-fashioned, 
rigid mechanisms of defense would 
seem, Brown suggests, rather pain-
fully out of step not only with 
the ostensibly cosmopolitan and 
self-assured ethos of the countries 
building them, but also with the 
real capabilities and tendencies of 
the two forces they are most com-
monly built as bulwarks against: 
immigration and terrorism.
In addressing the latter, for in-
stance, Brown finds it particularly 
puzzling that “in a time featuring 
capacities for destruction histori-
cally unparalleled in their combined 
potency, miniaturization, and mo-
bility” we find “these deadly but 
incorporeal powers are perversely 
answered by the stark physical-
ism of walls” (20). The disconnec-
tion between perceived threat and 
proleptic defense is only part of a 
broader series of troubling contra-
dictions marking contemporary 
political economy and international 
relations that Brown finds embod-
ied in border walls. Most generally, 
the walls under review in the book 
appear to Brown as structuring not 
only the barriers between countries, 
but the antinomical gap between 
the idealization of a “world without 
borders” by humanitarians and neo-
liberal politicians alike versus the si-
multaneous upholding of segratory 
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procedures for entrance by coun-
tries that pay the greatest lip service 
to openness and ecumenicity (20). 
Brown finds a partial resolution in 
emphasizing what is new about cur-
rent instantiations of the traditional 
technology of border walls: whereas 
walls historically were used by sov-
ereign nations as defenses against 
other sovereign nations, nowadays 
they instead “target nonstate tran-
sitional actors” (21). The specific 
forces they are intended to protect 
against—“migration, smuggling, 
crime, terror”—are only in excep-
tional circumstances state spon-
sored or easily aligned with the 
specific interests of a nation-state 
(21). If walls used to symbolize the 
authority and stability of a sover-
eign nation, they now instead sym-
bolize anxieties over the declining 
stature of nation-states as the pri-
mary political actors of the present, 
the role they have formally held in 
the West since the 1648 Peace of 
Westphalia. More and more today, 
Brown says, the walls have a “Wiz-
ard of Oz quality” about them, 
staging “an image of state intelli-
gence and control in the face of its 
opposite” (25).
Brown references a variety of 
such walls, both old and new, and 
photographs or blueprints or ten 
different national barriers are pre-
sented in the book’s introduction; 
the mere listing of the variety of 
these structures at various points 
bears its own persuasive import 
about the ambiguous purposes 
these barriers are taken to serve: 
“Iran is walling out Pakistan. Bru-
nei is walling out immigrants and 
smugglers from Limbang, Ma-
laysia. China is walling out North 
Korea to stem the tide of Korean 
refugees, but parallel to one sec-
tion of this wall, North Korea is 
also walling out China” (19). Her 
most consistent examples, however, 
are the “separation barriers” in the 
West Bank and similar Israeli-built 
structures, as well as various real 
and proposed walls along the bor-
der between the United States and 
Mexico. These cases do an excellent 
job of demonstrating the central 
point Brown returns to in Walled 
States—that we are currently wit-
nessing the migration of “key char-
acteristics of sovereignty” away 
from the traditional location in the 
the nation-state and toward “the 
unrelieved domination of capital 
and God-sanctioned political vio-
lence” (23). Indeed, one of the par-
ticularly compelling components of 
Brown’s argument is the creeping 
similarity between the US and Is-
raeli barriers. Although arguments 
in the United States for the urgency 
of fortifying the US–Mexico bor-
der have long been discussed via 
reference to the economic impact 
of undocumented immigrant la-
borers, more recently debates over 
border fortifications to both the 
South and the North have increas-
ingly referred to the possibilities 
of “Islamic” terrorists exploiting 
inadequately defended entryways. 
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Similarly, whereas the West Bank 
barrier and its predecessor struc-
tures have long had theocratic im-
plications, more recently its role as 
a barrier to the flow of goods and 
services has gained much atten-
tion. The 2007 documentary film 
9 Star Hotel (by Ido Haar), for in-
stance, follows a group of young 
Palestinian men who cross illegally 
into the Israeli city of Modi’in to 
work construction jobs. (Brown 
also mentions the striking example 
of a complaint by the member of 
an illegal Israeli settlement against 
the proposed path of the barrier’s 
extension; she was worried that it 
might block the route taken by her 
Palestinian maids in reporting for 
work.)
Interrogations of the relation-
ship between these three forces—
theopolitics, capitalist economics, 
and sovereignty—center each chap-
ter of Brown’s relatively slim vol-
ume. After an outlining of the 
paradoxes symbolized in our con-
temporary “passion for wall-build-
ing” (“Waning Sovereignty, Walled 
Democracy”), the second chap-
ter, “Sovereignty and Enclosure,” 
traces the emergence and refine-
ment of the concept of sovereignty 
in the West through the works of 
such figures as Hobbes, Jean Bodin, 
Locke, and Rousseau. Here, Brown 
presents a concise, compelling read-
ing of nation-state sovereignty as 
the political force that marks “the 
temporal end and spatial limit of 
the sovereignty of nature or God” 
(56) while also attempting to “de-
tach political life from the demands 
or imperatives of the economic” 
(58). If Westphalian sovereignty 
was shaped by the subordination 
and regulation of the religious and 
the economic, then we should not 
be surprised to see its decline result 
in the redistribution of powers to 
both of these other domains. This 
history also helps explain a recent 
resurgence in attempts to position 
nation-state sovereignty in theolog-
ical terms. As Brown writes, “[A]s 
it is weakened and rivaled by other 
forces, what remains of nation-state 
sovereignty becomes openly and 
aggressively rather than passively 
theological” (62). Or, as she puts it 
more bluntly elsewhere, “[S]over-
eignty needs God more as its other 
sources and powers thin and its ter-
ritorial grip falters” (63).
The admixture of the religious 
and the political that emerges when 
sovereignty is threatened, Brown 
suggests, most often appeals to 
the “decisionist” or “exceptional” 
power of the sovereign entity as 
sovereign entity, a concept now 
popularly associated with the work 
of Carl Schmitt, and one very much 
opposed to the tradition of popu-
lar legislative power prominent in 
the works of Locke and Rousseau. 
(Brown does not have to expend 
much more effort than quoting the 
second President Bush, who often 
appears as something like a vaude-
villian Carl Schmitt in Walled States, 
to emphasize the recent return of 
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“absolutist” power in American dis-
cussions of sovereignty in the recent 
past.) However, even a monarch 
seems outperformed by the mar-
ket in these times; after all, there 
are few examples of “sovereignty 
without the sovereign” better than 
global capitalism, a force that often 
appears, Brown suggests, to ap-
proximate “a god’s power to make 
the world without deliberation or 
calculation” (65). The uneasy inter-
action between the waning nation-
state and the rising theopolitics 
and global capital is detailed in 
the third chapter of Walled States, 
which takes up the ways in which 
walls alternately demonstrate the 
effects of state-generated discourses 
of fear and danger, as well as the 
popular desires and fantasies of its 
citizenry (“States and Subjects”). 
The concluding chapter (“Desir-
ing Walls”), presents an even more 
sustained (and psychoanalytically 
inclined) focus on the latter, map-
ping the “psychic reassurances or 
palliatives” that walls offer mod-
ern subjects suffering the anxieties 
attendant to the decline of nation-
state sovereignty. Here, Brown 
draws extensively on Freud’s study 
of religion in The Future of an Illu-
sion (1927), leaving readers with a 
depiction of nation-state walls as an 
inversion of that book’s title, “not 
the future of an illusion, but the il-
lusion of a future aligned with an 
idealized past” (133).
Several early responses to 
Walled States questioned whether 
the book’s reading of sovereignty 
might have aged rather abruptly 
in light of the events now known 
as the Arab Spring, populist up-
risings that started about a month 
after the text’s publication. These 
clashes seemed to bring back to 
the forefront the more procedural 
legacies of Westphalia (including 
policies of noninterference between 
nation-states), as well as the power 
of at least the idea of popular sov-
ereignty, one consistently invoked 
by participants in the Arab Spring 
and one that might seem too easily 
dismissed by Brown as, in her own 
words, “if not a fiction, something 
of an abstraction with a tenuous 
bearing on political reality” (49). 
However, if the discourses and ac-
tions of the citizenry seemed to 
suggest a great viability of popular 
sovereignty as a motivating factor, 
one could equally point to the ac-
tions on behalf of sovereign figures 
themselves—warnings that theo-
cratic or terroristic groups were 
behind such uprisings or would fill 
the void created by the absence of 
a strong ruler, invocations of anar-
chy or disappearance of the nation-
state, frequent references on behalf 
of all parties to how such incidents 
might disrupt the “global economic 
recovery”—as confirming Brown’s 
larger analysis of the psychic econ-
omy surrounding questions of 
sovereignty and the impositions 
of global capitalism and theopoli-
tics onto its territories. Perhaps 
the more interesting question on 
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this score is the more generic one: 
What relationship do we expect (or 
desire) between such phenomena 
and Brown’s text as an instance of 
theorizing (and thus itself an ab-
straction) and critique (and thus 
an analysis into the often hidden 
conditions and consequences of the 
forces behind such phenomena)?
This question is itself one also 
very much under review within 
Walled States; in addition to re-
flecting on her own methodologi-
cal approach multiple times in the 
text—“[W]hat does it mean to treat 
nation-state walling as a theoretical 
object when it does not emerge and 
exist in the world as such?” (27)—
Brown also wonders whether much 
of recent critical theory in general, 
with its focus on the discursive, the 
contingent, and the hidden, can ad-
equately address such obvious and 
physical manifestations of social 
power as border walls (80). Indeed, 
contemporary walled states seem to 
function, Brown writes, as a rebuke 
not only to “every liberal hope for 
a global village”—the low-hanging 
fruit for any leftist critique of this 
type—but also to “every post-struc-
turalist theorization of power” (81). 
While Brown references Derrida, 
Foucault, and Deleuze amongst 
others as examples of participants 
in the latter endeavor, more recent 
critical work on the question of 
sovereignty, specifically by the likes 
of Agamben and Hardt and Negri, 
hardly fairs better in her estima-
tion; indeed, in a piece published 
prior to Walled States on similar 
subject matter, she suggests that 
much “left and liberal theoreti-
cal sovereignty talk” may be little 
more than “a search for a kind of 
Viagra for the political.”11 If critical 
theory has devoted the majority of 
its intellectual efforts to teaching us 
about the immaterial and elusive 
symbology of power as it functions 
in language, science, the psyche, 
etc., perhaps it has prepared us less 
well to deal with such obvious and 
material manifestations of social 
power as the literal walls expand-
ing across the globe.
In this sense, it might be said 
that the psychoanalytic analysis 
that forms the final chapter of 
the text, though perhaps the best 
example of Brown’s reliably pow-
erful argumentation and phras-
ing, undercuts the book’s more 
consistent strengths. Comparing 
the walls under review to Anna 
Freud’s study of ego defense—in 
both cases the defenses thrown up 
against fear of external threats end 
up (re)defining the very thing they 
are meant to protect—is undoubt-
edly appropriate, but in some ways 
detracts from Brown’s suggestion 
that the paradoxes of contemporary 
sovereignty reside in plain sight; in 
other words, the same point seems 
to have been already made without 
needing the help of a psychoanalytic 
detour such as this one. Although 
the walls discussed in Brown’s 
text reside physically between na-
tion-states, she also suggests they 
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mark an “in-between” of modes 
of power, “a global interregnum” 
that designates a “time after the 
era of state sovereignty, but before 
the articulation or instantiation 
of an alternate global order” (39). 
Though it is the great benefit of 
this text to encapsulate this transi-
tion moment within its analysis, we 
might also posit Brown’s approach 
here as itself marking a transitional 
moment in critique of its type. If 
paradox is the rule rather than ex-
ception in the contemporary poli-
tics of sovereignty, its exposure or 
revelation seems to not so much 
inhibit or negate its power but offer 
lessons regarding its “uses” in vari-
ous contexts. Thus for instance, in 
interviews around the time of the 
publication of Walled States, Brown 
has more explicitly addressed the 
“huge space for the Left” opened 
by renewal of populist anger and 
ad hoc organizing, even if most 
recently these areas have (on the 
American scene at least) been 
dominated largely by conservative 
and reactionary groups.12 In this 
sense, then, the contribution Brown 
makes via Walled States may be to 
mark off a transitional moment not 
only in the concept of sovereignty 
within the political imaginary but 
also within the movement of left-
political theorizing and critical 
praxis.
On this score, and in regards 
to the larger question with which 
we began, it was highly enlighten-
ing to read Walled States, Waning 
Sovereignty in conjunction with 
recent works by Alberto Toscano, 
Isabelle Stengers, and Erik Olin 
Wright. If Brown’s text can be read 
as a diagnostic of the transitional 
moment of global social power and 
a concomitant reconsideration of 
the role of critique and left-theoriz-
ing, these texts similarly combine 
these objectives while pushing to-
ward more specific rethinkings of 
the role of intellectual abstraction 
in politics as a whole (Toscano), the 
formation of attachments between 
people and new constellations of 
thought and knowledge (Stengers), 
and the appropriate strategies for 
forwarding egalitarian political 
goals (Wright).
Alberto Toscano’s Fanaticism 
is a far-reaching study of the vari-
ous ways that its title subject, one 
Toscano cleanly defines, follow-
ing Hegel, as “enthusiasm for the 
abstract,” has driven intellectual 
history and populist politics (xi). 
Emphasizing the identification of 
fanaticism with a commitment to 
abstract principles, as opposed to 
our knee-jerk associations with 
religion or the irrational, allows 
Toscano, on the one hand, to em-
phasize the historical flexibility of 
the term, notably the role of osten-
sibly “anti-fanatical” or “neutral” 
discourses, such as secularism or 
the “free market,” to function as fa-
naticisms in their own right. On the 
other, it also allows Toscano to un-
derscore the long history of fanati-
cism as a concept within political 
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philosophy and cultural theory, 
disciplines that have consistently 
attempted to identify the relation-
ship between ideational abstraction 
and concrete action, as well as to 
sort out fanaticism from its more 
benevolent cousins: enthusiasm, 
partisanship, and commitment.
The former of these objectives 
is well served by Toscano’s wide-
ranging survey of the “uses of the 
idea” of fanaticism from the En-
lightenment onward. And Fanati-
cism’s topics and sites are indeed 
expansive; the first chapter (“Fig-
ures of Extremism”) alone moves 
from a consideration of American 
abolitionist struggles, to revolts 
against British colonialism, to the 
emergence of the “politics of pas-
sion” as a sticking point in twen-
tieth-century political thought (as 
seen in the works of Francis Fu-
kuyama, Michael Walzer, Peter 
Sloterdijk, and Badiou, amongst 
others). Chapter 2 (“The Birth of 
Modern Politics Out of the Spirit 
of Millenarianism”) takes up the 
legacy of the German Peasants’ 
War of the early sixteenth century 
and considers how its historical 
condemnation influenced twenti-
eth-century radical thought (and, 
in turn, largely set the stage for cri-
tiques of fanaticism within revolu-
tionary political strategy generally). 
The third chapter (“Raving with 
Reason: Fanaticism and the En-
lightenment”) presents a striking 
reading of the centrality of debates 
over fanaticism, “enthusiasm,” and 
related concepts within the think-
ing of key Enlightenment figures. 
Chapter 4 (“The Revolutions of the 
East: Islam, Hegel, Psychoanaly-
sis”) expertly rereads Hegel’s writ-
ing on Islam as part of a broader 
consideration of the religion’s use as 
the reliable default image of fanati-
cism for the West. Finally, chapter 
5 (“The Cold War and the Messiah: 
On Political Religion”) engages the 
postsecular turn in recent critical 
theory and the general resurgence 
of popular interest in the relation-
ship between politics and religion 
in recent times.
As mentioned, part of the value 
of such a broad, diverse inquiry 
into discourses “of” and about fa-
naticism is its emphasis of the am-
biguity of the term; readers may be 
surprised to discover, for instance, 
the consistent depiction of antislav-
ery activists prior to the Civil War 
as fanatics, a charge memorialized, 
amongst other places, in the title of 
William Drayton’s 1836 The South 
Vindicated from the Treason and 
Fanaticism of the Northern Aboli-
tionists. Similarly, though Enlight-
enment philosophes may reside in 
the popular imagination as help-
ing to usher in the age of reason, 
Toscano is quick to remind us of 
Edmund Burke’s accusation that 
their own “horrible fanaticism”—
their application of atheistic and 
abstract philosophizing to social 
questions—was “a thousand times 
more dangerous than that inspired 
by religion” (quoted on xvii).
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However, it is important to 
note that Toscano’s main objec-
tive in this survey is not simply to 
suggest that the concept has been 
bankrupted by ambiguous and 
contradictory use over several cen-
turies (yesterday’s fanatic is today’s 
arbiter of reason), nor to forward 
some weak version of cosmopoli-
tanism to counter our predisposi-
tions to dismissing others under 
the name of fanaticism. Rather, 
Toscano argues that we need not 
so much resist claims of fanaticism 
as to understand the crucial role, 
perhaps the necessary one, of it as 
a force in political change and to in 
turn become better at finding ways 
direct its energies for strategic pur-
poses. Thus, for instance, Toscano 
does not deny that American abo-
litionists were fanatics; rather, he 
emphasizes how their fanaticism 
emerged from an understanding of 
the weakness of deliberative politics 
on this issue and “was thus both a 
matter of passionate conviction and 
mediated strategy, combining the 
attractions of symbolism and affect 
with the instruments of power and 
calculation” (10).
Toscano’s intervention here is 
perhaps best understood via his 
careful tracing of the legacies of En-
lightenment thought on fanaticism. 
As Toscano writes, one can roughly 
discern two philosophical perspec-
tives on the subject that emerged 
from debates over enthusiasm and 
fanaticism in key Enlightenment 
thinkers: one that positions it “as 
the outside of reason, the persistent 
threat of pathological partisanship 
or clerical irrationality” and the 
other that takes “some uncondi-
tional and unyielding abstract pas-
sion as intrinsic to a universalizing 
rationality and emancipatory poli-
tics” (xvii). It is not hard to guess 
which of these two positions, which 
Toscano aligns roughly with the re-
spective endowments of Voltaire’s 
Lumières and the Aufklärung of 
Kant, has received the most support 
in contemporary populist politi-
cal thought. Indeed, Toscano finds 
many contemporary representa-
tives of the “bad” Enlightenment 
marking various corners of current 
political debate, notably those who 
participate in the West’s long reli-
ance on Islam as our default image 
of fanaticism and thus forward 
“the widespread belief that we are 
experiencing the repetition or con-
tinuation of that struggle between 
reason and unreason, freedom and 
subjection, knowledge and igno-
rance which was first played out 
in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries in Europe” (101).
Although Toscano finds simi-
larly problematic invocations of 
fanaticism-as-dismissal in some con-
temporary critical theory (Sloterdi-
jk’s recent “psychopolitical” writings 
and Žižek’s rather depressing take 
on Islam come under fire), he iden-
tifies the turn to religious ideas of 
redemption in the works of Der-
rida and Badiou as more salutary 
attempts “to evade the critiques of 
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universalism as fanaticism while 
not giving up an iota of the radi-
cality demanded by a transforma-
tive, oppositional and emancipatory 
political thought” (245). Derrida’s 
effort in this regard in Specters of 
Marx (1993) is found lacking, how-
ever, largely due to his allergy to-
ward the ontological and historical 
materialist dimensions of his own 
subject matter. Although, for To-
scano, Badiou fares much better in 
this regard, his understanding of 
political commitment and its role 
in revolutionary changes seems to 
elide considerations of strategy and 
context. Or, as Toscano phrases 
it, “[A] certain passivity functions 
here as an antidote to the censures 
that inevitably greet a Promethean 
subjectivity that seeks to change 
the world on the basis of a truth it 
claims to possess” (246).
Thus, although he is broadly 
sympathetic to Badiou’s writings 
on ontology and commitment, To-
scano’s handling of these topics in 
Fanaticism is, at least for this reader, 
much more patient and pragmatic. 
This may be because Toscano’s ap-
proach is in many ways a reversal 
of that taken by Badiou in regards 
to the historical dimensions of po-
litical change. As Toscano explains 
early in the text, the relationship 
between fanaticism and history is 
inherently paradoxical. On the one 
hand, the disruptive force of fanati-
cism is out of necessity tied to its “ex-
plicit refusal of history as a domain 
of gradualism and mediation” in 
favor of an uncompromising devo-
tion to abstract principles (xxi). On 
the other, however, it cannot have 
a disruptive effect without also re-
lying on a conception of history as 
“a naturalized dimension of pre-
dictable combinations” to which it 
can be opposed. Badiou’s approach 
to this dilemma largely works to-
ward abstracting the elements of 
radical change from its occurrences 
in recorded history: searching for 
a transhistorical formulation that 
captures the emergence of world-
changing events within history. 
Toscano might be taken as work-
ing in the opposite direction, to-
ward a historicizing of abstraction 
and placing a greater emphasis on 
precisely the pull or allure of ab-
straction and its role in the poli-
tics of various historical contexts. 
Importantly, this difference in ap-
proach saves Toscano from having 
to determine a method for sorting 
out “good” and “bad” instances of 
radical commitment that might 
seem to follow the same formulist 
pattern, and to instead focus on the 
possible “uses” of not only the “idea 
of fanaticism” but how more gen-
eralized force fields of enthusiasm, 
affective attachment, and commit-
ment might be used in shaping the 
politics of the present.
In Toscano’s final analysis, 
then, our anxieties about fanati-
cism are themselves a symptom of 
a larger problem we have with ac-
cepting radical commitment to the 
abstract as a component of political 
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thought and as a motivator of po-
litical praxis. As he writes near the 
book’s closing, “[A]ttempts to as-
sert some abstractions (such as po-
litical equality) against others (such 
as monetary equivalence), require 
that we find ways of connecting a 
politics founded on the refusal of 
compromise with the openings or 
closures provided by contemporary 
capitalism” (251). Only by find-
ing ways to work on and through 
the forces of fanaticism, to “tune” 
our own and others’ devotions to 
various abstractions, can we hope 
to respond effectively to times of 
crisis wherein such commitments 
proliferate.
Determining precisely how 
such attachments occur and the 
underpinnings of abstraction itself 
within human cognition and sense-
making is a major focus of Isabelle 
Stengers’s Cosmopolitics I, the Eng-
lish translation of the first three 
books of a seven-volume series 
that has already been published in 
French. In this text, Stengers largely 
picks up from where her previous 
work, The Invention of Modern Sci-
ence, left off.13 In the final chapter of 
that text, Stengers argued for a “re-
turn to the sophists” via a rereading 
of the sophist Protagoras’s famous 
statement declaring that “man is 
the measure of all things”; contra its 
popular interpretation as advocat-
ing a certain necessary relativism 
in regards to our understanding of 
the world, Stengers suggested we 
might do better in considering the 
immense responsibility projected 
by that position and our need to 
recognize the role of belief in sci-
entific investigation and discovery. 
Cosmopolitics I also begins with an 
invocation of what Stengers calls 
“nonrelativist sophists,” but she 
shifts ground somewhat in clarify-
ing more specifically the distinc-
tion between what she calls “the 
politics constitutive of the sciences” 
as opposed to “a general politics of 
power.” The former designates the 
identification of scientific inven-
tion via its separation from myth 
and opinion, what Stengers refers 
to as the “event constituted by the 
creation of a measurement.” Such 
an event, Stengers reminds us, is 
different than its reduction as “an 
illustration of the right and general 
obligation to subject all things to 
measurement” (11). Framed more 
generally, Stengers’s overarching 
concern is not so much to question 
the validity of any specific aspect of 
modern science as it is to ask after 
how such validation within science, 
which here might be only our most 
obvious category of thought systems 
that claim universality, often comes 
at the expense of discrediting claims 
and practices outside of itself.
Stengers has two primary ap-
proaches to this problem through-
out Cosmopolitics I: a rethinking of 
the nature of scientific production 
(so that it might obtain an identity 
that is not reliant on the disquali-
fication of the “nonscientific”) and 
a relatively more novel attempt to 
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thematize the role of “symbiosis” in 
not only scientific practice but so-
cial life (specifically the accidental 
or strategic ways in which the in-
terests of different actants intersect 
or complement each other). If the 
first of these maintains Stengers’s 
position as one of our most bril-
liant practitioners of science stud-
ies scholarship, the second is what 
gives an unusually broad reach to 
the politics of the book’s title and 
Stengers’s more general cosmopo-
litical, as opposed to cosmopolitan, 
approach. If cosmopolitanism pre-
sumes the possibility of a shared 
common world, Stengers proposes 
instead political strategies based on 
the manipulation or creation of op-
portunities for symbiosis between 
individuals and collectivities that 
do not rely on ideational consensus 
or the synthesis of disparate goals 
or beliefs.
These two objectives—a cri-
tique of the conceptual imperi-
alism of modern science and a 
thematization of the politics of so-
cial symbiosis—might not seem to 
naturally complement each other, 
but one of the great accomplish-
ments of Stengers’s work in Cos-
mopolitics I is to demonstrate how 
the same process of reconceiving 
science as an “ecology of practices” 
rather than an exclusively episte-
mological or metaphysical domain 
can also be leveraged to rethink 
the formalisms that limit our po-
litical imaginations. As with To-
scano, Stengers’s approach might 
be also best understood in contrast 
to another thinker who has many 
of the same objectives. Much like 
Bruno Latour, Stengers tends to 
emphasize the creative power of 
scientific discoveries—the ways in 
which the naming of a substance 
or recognition of the relationship 
between different properties have 
their own material consequences 
and in a sense concretely change 
our contemporary reality. Latour’s 
emphasis, however, has most often 
been on the ostensible epistemolog-
ical novelty of this viewpoint. For 
instance, Latour has emphasized 
the “backward causation” of scien-
tific discoveries, the ways in which, 
to use one of his most popular ex-
amples, although airborne germs 
can’t be said to have an identity 
prior to Pasteur’s work in 1864 
made them “known” to humans, 
it is possible to say that, after 1864, 
“airborne germs were there all 
along.”14 Stengers, too, follows the 
novel logic of scientific “discover-
ies,” as well as the ways in which 
some more pivotal instance of the 
same give birth to entirely new 
fields that in turn not only “add” 
to reality, but shape the ways in 
which we are intended to order or 
understand reality “itself.” Thus, 
for instance, Stengers turns more 
than once to the discovery of the 
neutrino as a pivotal moment in 
the formation of a “revolutionary 
physics” in which contradictory 
observable phenomena can be jus-
tifiably discounted.
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Stengers’s more urgent concern, 
however, is the way in which such 
changes in what “counts” and what 
can be contested in science tend to 
become delocalized and imported 
into other domains, impacting 
what counts in society as a whole or 
crowding out other disciplines and 
less formal forms of cognition and 
abstraction. Stengers’s stand against 
the becoming-generic of science, 
however, is no call for a prophylac-
tic skepticism or general advoca-
tion of relativism. In regards to the 
former, she continually identifies 
the need to “escape from a general-
ized polemic that puts every prac-
tice in a position of disqualifying 
and/or in danger of being disquali-
fied” as the unique problem that 
guides her critique of modern sci-
ence (58). The possibility of relativ-
ism or pleas for simple tolerance as 
viable alternatives are also concisely 
dismissed in a provocative aside in 
Cosmopolitics I in which Stengers 
wryly identifies capitalism as “the 
only truly tolerant and relativist 
undertaking that I know of”: “It 
alone is capable of radically align-
ing disparate practices and value 
only to turn against those whose 
destruction would be of interest to 
it; for it is radically indifferent to 
whatever binds them and is itself 
bound by nothing” (74). (Anyone 
who might mistakenly think this 
association is meant to speak well 
of relativism need do no more than 
read the title of Stengers’s more 
recent collaboration with Phillipe 
Pignarre, Capitalist Sorcery: Break-
ing the Spell.15)
Rather, Stengers suggests that 
recognizing the material and pro-
cessual nature of modern science 
might also lead us toward political 
strategies that require neither nihil-
ism nor “the recognition of a more 
powerful interest before which di-
vergent particular interests would 
have to bow down” (34). This, 
then, is perhaps the most succinct 
connection between Stengers’s de-
piction of science as an “ecology 
of practices” and her forwarding 
of dynamic ecology as a political 
model. As Stengers writes, despite 
our tendencies to personalize and 
formalize ecology, it does not “un-
derstand consensus but, at most, 
symbiosis, in which every protago-
nist is interested in the success of 
the other for its own reasons” (35). 
Such a perspective, not despite but 
because of its depersonalization, 
may actually be a better model for 
crafting social change because it 
does not require us to “enlighten” 
oppositional groups toward our 
epistemological or ethical correct-
ness, but instead gives us the bur-
den of creating novel and strategic 
alliances that capitalize on the over-
lap of respective desires.
Despite their large differences 
in their ostensible subject matter, 
the same general strategy, and the 
concept of symbiosis as a model, 
is very much the driving force of 
Erik Olen Wright’s Envisioning 
Real Utopias, a work that, like all of 
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the works reviewed in this essay, is 
profitably considered as an attempt 
to rethink the possibilities of criti-
cal theory given the challenges of 
the present. Wright, however, is by 
far the most systematic in his ap-
proach to this endeavor, and a great 
strength of his work in this text is to 
simultaneously place great faith in 
the power of “emancipatory social 
science” to make positive change in 
the world while at the same time 
insisting on pragmatic, some might 
even say modest, goals for it in the 
near future.
The general framework of En-
visioning Real Utopias follows what 
Wright stipulates to be the three 
essential tasks of emancipatory so-
cial science of any era: “elaborating 
a systematic diagnosis and critique 
of the world as it exists; envision-
ing viable alternatives; and under-
standing the obstacles, possibilities, 
and dilemmas of transformation” 
(10). Wright gently suggests at 
many moments in the text that the 
first of these activities—critique 
itself—has traditionally received 
the highest priority and claimed 
the lion’s share of ink from critical 
theorists over the last half-century. 
Thus, while acknowledging the 
necessity of the diagnostic vector 
of “emancipatory” scholarship, as 
well as providing a lucid, concise 
example of the same in a chapter 
with the almost-charming title 
“What’s So Bad about Capital-
ism?” Wright’s fundamental focus 
is on the second of these three tasks: 
the creation of alternative models 
of social and economic life. These 
are the “real utopias” of the book’s 
titles, case studies of “actually exist-
ing” socialist forms of cooperation, 
such as participatory budgeting 
practices in Porto Alegre and the 
cooperative governance structure 
of the Mondragón Corporation.
Wright’s turn to “real utopias” 
here is meant as a way to preserve 
many of the objectives of Marxist 
social theory while jettisoning any 
remaining teleogical visions of the 
failure of capitalism and its replace-
ment by collective ownership of 
the means of production. Instead, 
Wright draws our attention to 
the hybrid forms of socialism and 
capitalism that already exist within 
contemporary economies; subse-
quently he suggests that eman-
cipatory scholars should switch 
their emphasis to designing what 
Wright calls a “socialist compass,” a 
metric for determining, first, what 
potential changes in the political 
economy will take us closer to our 
emancipatory goals and, second, 
which strategies are viable within 
the specific contexts of different 
countries and existing economic 
systems.
Wright’s careful attention to 
context leads him to suggest, for in-
stance, that forwarding of a guaran-
teed basic income might ironically 
“be more sustainable in a society 
with a strong consumerist culture, 
since people in such a society are 
likely to have strong preferences 
 ON POSTCRITICAL THEORY? 655
for discretionary income” (221). 
Envisioning Real Utopias is full of 
counterintuitive, but ultimately 
persuasive arguments such as these, 
most of which preserve an un-
doubted optimism about potential 
solutions to economic injustices but 
focus on incremental, short-term 
goals as starting points. At the same 
time, however, this tempered ap-
proach is likely to disappoint read-
ers who, understandably, might 
have less patience about the pace of 
the proposed changes under review, 
as well as Wright’s more specific 
suggestion that some socialist goals 
are decidedly “off the table” given 
the political orientations of some 
countries and communities (147), 
or his insistence that, “in order to 
gain the virtues latent within a 
capitalist organization of economic 
structures,” some version of capital-
ism may be a necessary part of any 
sustainable economic system (162).
Similarly, many of Wright’s 
key examples—Mondragón, Porto 
Alegre—will already be familiar to 
readers of left-oriented sociology, 
and others might be found wanting. 
In the latter category, it is particu-
larly hard to accept Wright’s con-
tention that the open-author online 
encyclopedia Wikipedia demon-
strates “a profoundly anti-capitalist 
way of producing and disseminat-
ing knowledge” and is based on the 
egalitarian principle “to each ac-
cording to need, from each accord-
ing to ability” (3). It is not so much 
that Wright is incorrect here—it 
is certainly true that Wikipedia has 
emerged as a striking example of 
the productive power of unremu-
nerated collective labor—but it 
seems a bit much to hold it up as 
“profoundly anti-capitalist,” partic-
ularly, as Wright reminds us many 
other times in Envisioning Real Uto-
pias, as capitalism is too diverse and 
protean a system to be identified 
(and one might then also suggest, 
be opposed) in its “pure” form.
In the final analysis, however, 
what makes Wright’s book so pro-
vocative is not so much the examples 
he forwards as “viable alternatives,” 
as his unwavering insistence on via-
bility itself as a criterion for emanci-
patory thought. Wright’s strongest 
statement on this score is in the final 
section of Envisioning Real Utopias, 
covering the third and final task of 
“transformation” that he assigns 
to emancipatory social science. In 
four brief but compelling chapters, 
Wright details the role of theories 
of structural change in political 
thought and three generic models 
of the same. Although Wright gives 
a fair hearing to the strengths of the 
first two, more traditional, forms—
coded as the “ruptural” and the 
“interstitial”—both are eventually 
dismissed for, respectively, pre-
suming they can “smash the state” 
as the locus of social power or for 
ignoring its importance altogether. 
Instead, Wright proposes “symbi-
otic transformation” as a guide for 
emancipatory programs, strategies 
that “seek to create the conditions 
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for positive collaboration” between 
groups with opposing interests 
(306).
As one might expect given 
Wright’s large amount of previous 
research on class and the general 
(post-)Marxist bent of Utopias, two 
key “opposing interests” here are 
those of capitalists and those of the 
working class. Specifically, Wright 
proposes a particular kind of “class 
compromise” in which “the asso-
ciational power of the working class 
and the material interests of capital-
ists” can be combined in actions 
that benefit both in the short term 
and lead to greater social equality in 
the long term (338–39). Although 
not entirely restricted to strategic 
overlaps of this type, Wright’s gen-
eral notion of symbiotic strategies 
relies on designing solutions to con-
crete social problems that generally 
increase the power of the working 
class in some way and thus take us 
in the direction of more egalitarian 
social arrangements even as they 
serve the immediate needs of an 
often unjust capitalist society. Com-
ing at the end of the book, Wright’s 
proposal includes a brief rereading 
of economic history to emphasize 
the ways in which such symbiosis 
has served progressive aims in the 
past and also gives us a lens for re-
reading the more contemporary 
examples of “real utopias” covered 
earlier in the book.
Wright’s frequent use of the 
word “compromise” (class-based or 
otherwise) gives easy ammunition 
to those who would dismiss his vi-
sion of emancipatory action as al-
ready “compromised,” his approval 
of “hybrid” economies, baby-step 
socialism, and class symbiosis as 
corrupt from the start. However, 
it is precisely Wright’s out-of-step 
relation to more militant egalitarian 
theories of the past, and the “revo-
lutionary fetish” of current progres-
sive thought as seen in the works of 
writers like Badiou and Žižek, that 
might make his work one of the 
more radical entries into contempo-
rary critical theorizing. As already 
suggested in this review, Wright’s 
work in this regard might be taken 
as only the most explicit statement 
of an undercurrent at work in all 
of the texts reviewed here, with his 
real utopias and symbiotic strategies 
only a more systematic articulation 
of the thinking behind Brown’s di-
agnosis of the transitional state of 
contemporary social power, Tosca-
no’s recuperation of abstraction and 
fanaticism as necessary rather than 
abject components of contemporary 
politics, and Stengers’s own sugges-
tion of the symbiotic as a postcritical 
rejoinder to the impotence of rela-
tivism and the ubiquity of opposi-
tional claims and interests. All find 
their power in a certain beleaguered 
acceptance that the traditional tools 
of leftist critical theory have been 
co-opted by the right, but also in a 
rededication to finding immanent 
modes of engaging the problems 
of contemporary politics despite 
the potential compromises it might 
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entail. Or, as Stengers phrases it, 
they are all joined in a “gamble that 
the present still provides substance 
for resistance, that it is populated by 
practices that remain vital even if 
none of them has escaped the gen-
eralized parasitism that implicated 
them all” (10).
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